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Abstract—Secret key generation exploits the unique random
features of wireless channels, hence it is eminently suitable for the
resource constrained Internet of Things applications. However,
it has only been involved for single links between a pair of
users, whilst there is a paucity of literature on group and
multi-user key generation. This paper proposes an orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)-based multi-user
key generation protocol to efficiently establish keys in a star
topology. The uplink and downlink multi-user access facilitated
by OFDMA allows the central node to simultaneously commu-
nicate with multiple users, which can significantly reduce the
channel probing overhead. In particular, we provide a compelling
case study of multi-user secret key generation by designing a
prototype based on IEEE 802.11ax, a new Wi-Fi standard to
be released. Our simulation results have demonstrated that the
OFDMA-based multi-user key generation protocol incurs low
interference amongst the users, whilst benefiting from channel
reciprocity and generating unique random keys.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, group key genera-
tion, multi-user key generation, multi-user access, OFDMA,
IEEE 802.11ax
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has significantly transformed
our lives with ubiquitous connections among devices, the
environment and people, which has triggered many exciting
applications such as smart homes, smart cities, healthcare, etc.
While the IoT brings convenience to our everyday life, it also
introduces potential problems, since it is prone to the lack of
data confidentiality. Secure connections are thus essential to
the provision of reliable and confidential communications [1].
Wireless communications are usually protected by conven-
tional cryptography, which requires a common key shared
between the communication parties, e.g. by using public
key cryptography (PKC). PKC is widely used to protect
Manuscript received xxx xx, 2019; revised xxx xx, 2019; accepted xxx xx,
2019. Date of publication xxx xx, 2019; date of current version xxx xx 2019.
The work of L. Hanzo was supported by the EPSRC projects EP/N004558/1,
EP/P034284/1, the Royal Society’s GCRF Grant as well as the European
Research Council’s Advanced Fellow Grant QuantCom. The associate editor
coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was
xxx xxx.
J. Zhang and A. Marshall are with the Department of Electrical Engineering
and Electronics, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3GJ, United King-
dom. (email: junqing.zhang@liverpool.ac.uk; alan.marshall@liverpool.ac.uk)
M. Ding is with the Data61, CSIRO, Eveleigh, NSW 2015, Australia (e-
mail: Ming.Ding@data61.csiro.au).
D. Lo´pez-Pe´rez is with Nokia Bell Labs, Dublin, Ireland (email:
david.lopezperez@nokia-bell-labs.com)
L. Hanzo is with the School of Electronics and Computer Sci-
ence, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, U.K. (email:
lh@ecs.soton.ac.uk).
Digital Object Identifier xxx
communications and computer networks, but its application
in the future IoT may be challenging for several reasons.
Firstly, PKC is computationally demanding, which is not
suitable for low-cost devices. Moreover, PKC is designed
based on computationally complex mathematical problems,
such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which
may be cracked by the emerging quantum computers [2].
Automatic key generation based on the randomness of
wireless channels has been identified as a promising alter-
native to establishing cryptographic keys [3]. This technique
generates keys between a pair of legitimate users with no
assistance from a third party. Using a lightweight procedure,
compared to the popular elliptic curve-based Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) PKC scheme, the results in [4] indicate that an
ECDH protocol dissipates about 100 times more energy and
imposes about 1000 times higher complexity than the key
generation counterpart, when both are implemented by an 8-
bit Intel MCS-51 micro-controller. Key generation has also
been proved to be information theoretically-secure, as it relies
on the unpredictable random wireless channels [5]. Thus, this
technique is particularly suitable for low-cost and resource-
constrained devices.
Network nodes can be arranged in different topologies,
e.g. star and mesh topologies, depending on their specific
applications. However, the star topology has become more
popular, since it is easy to maintain, and hence has been used
in numeral networks, such as Wi-Fi, cellular, LoRaWAN, etc.,
where a central controller1 coordinates the connections of a
number of devices.
In the considered star topology, the central controller may
want to broadcast securely to all the network nodes, which
requires a common group key shared among all the com-
munication parties. In other scenarios, the controller may
have to transmit unicast messages securely to each device,
which will require different private session keys established
between the controller and each device. Key generation has
been mainly applied to pairs of users [4], [6]–[16]. Substantial
research efforts have been invested in designing group key
generation [17]–[21], but channel probing still has to be carried
out in a pairwise manner, which imposes substantial cost in
terms of the number of transmissions and channel occupation.
How to assign these keys in an efficient and secure manner at
a low communication overhead is still an open question.
1The name of the controller will differ according to the specific techniques,
such as access point (AP), base station, and gateway in the Wi-Fi, cellular,
and LoRaWAN systems, respectively.
2To address this open problem, we consider multi-user key
generation in a star topology. Multi-user access can be realized
in the code, frequency and spatial domains. In particular,
code-division multiple access (CDMA) allocates user-specific
orthogonal codes to different users as in 3G UMTS, while
orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) al-
locates orthogonal frequency resources to different users as
in 4G LTE. Instead, IEEE 802.11ac, based on orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM), uses neither code-
nor frequency-domain user separation, but multi-antenna tech-
nology and allocates unique user-specific spatial streams for
supporting downlink (DL) multi-user transmissions. However,
key generation requires bidirectional transmissions to obtain
correlated channel measurements, which poses some chal-
lenges/restrictions for the above multi-user techniques, when
it comes to key generation.
IEEE 802.11ax [22] constitutes a new Wi-Fi standard
amendment to be released in 2019, which supports both DL
and uplink (UL) multi-user transmissions by using OFDMA
in the same channel. In this paper we design for the first
time an efficient OFDMA-based key generation protocol to
simultaneously establish keys between the AP and a number
of stations2, whilst relying on the IEEE 802.11ax features. In
particular, our contributions are as follows.
• An efficient multi-user key generation protocol is pro-
posed by employing OFDMA. The UL and DL multi-user
access supported by OFDMA allows multiple channel
measurements to be carried out at the same time, which
significantly reduces the channel probing overhead.
• An IEEE 802.11ax-based case study is carried out and
extensive simulation results are presented. The proposed
protocol can be implemented in the context of the stan-
dard IEEE 802.11ax system, with no standard modifica-
tions required. The simulation results demonstrate that the
proposed multi-user key generation protocol has a good
performance in terms of imposing low interference on the
users, whilst benefiting from a high degree of channel
reciprocity as well as from a unique key.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the related work on multi-user/group key generation
protocols. Section III proposes an OFDMA-based multi-user
key generation protocol, while an IEEE 802.11ax-based case
study is given in Section IV. Our simulation results are
provided in Section V while Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
As shown in Fig. 1, a key generation protocol usually
involves four steps, including channel probing, quantization,
information reconciliation and privacy amplification [3]. The
majority of key generation protocols run between a pair of
legitimate users, namely Alice and Bob. In order to obtain
correlated channel observations, key generation is usually
studied with the aid of systems operating in time division
duplexing (TDD) mode, e.g. Wi-Fi [6]–[9], ZigBee [4], [10]–
[12], Bluetooth [13], and LoRa [14]–[16], etc.
2A station is a device that supports Wi-Fi functions in the Wi-Fi terminol-
ogy. This paper uses station and user interchangeably.
Transmitting
Channel
Measuring
tj
+ Δ  
 
j == Np
Quantization
Information
Reconciliation
Privacy
Ampliﬁcation
 
 
 
¯
 
: 01110...
 
 
Alice
Channel
Measuring
Transmitting
Quantization
Information
Reconciliation
Privacy
Ampliﬁcation
 
 
 
¯
 
: 01010...
 
 
Bob
Channel 
Probing
Public 
Discussion
Key Generation
Symmetric
Encryption
Symmetric
Decryption
Plaintext Ciphertext Plaintext
Key Generation
Fig. 1. Key generation protocol and symmetric encryption.
During the channel probing stage, at time tj and tj + ∆t,
Alice and Bob transmit alternately to each other and obtain
measurements, sA and sB , respectively. They will repeat
the bidirectional measurements Np times to obtain sufficient
data for key generation. Channel reciprocity implies that the
channel responses at each end of the link are similar [9],
[23], provided that both the transmitting and receiving front-
ends are calibrated. Therefore, the channel measurements at
Alice and Bob will be highly correlated when the sampling
interval, ∆t, is kept shorter than the channel’s coherence time.
At the quantization stage, Alice and Bob will independently
convert the channel measurements into binary sequences, kA
and kB , respectively, by comparing the received signals to
some thresholds. The unsynchronized sampling, interference
and noise at the receiver will result in mismatch between the
quantized key bits. Hence, information reconciliation is then
adopted to correct this mismatch by exploiting the correction
capability of error correction codes [24]. Finally, privacy
amplification is used to remove any possible leakages of
the keying information to eavesdroppers and to enhance the
security of the key sequences generated, e.g. by using a hash
function.
Alice and Bob will then get the same keys, i.e., k¯A = k¯B .
The keys can be used for symmetric encryption to provide
secure and confidential data communications [25]. Among
the four steps of the key generation, channel probing is the
key step of harvesting entropy from the environment and
supporting secure communications. Hence we focuses our
attention on the design of an efficient channel probing protocol
to obtain channel measurements from multiple users at a
minimum overhead.
Many wireless networks require secure data exchange
among a number of users. There have been a good num-
ber of group key generation protocols designed for different
network topologies [17]–[21]. Liu et al. proposed protocols
3for star topologies in order to share a common secret among
nodes [17]. Specifically, a central node is first selected and a
reference channel, pref , is calculated between the central node,
nc, and another randomly selected node, nref . The central
node transmits to all the other nodes while the received signal
strength at the uth node is pfu. The nodes then respond to the
central node via the reverse channels, where the signal strength
at the central node is pru. Finally, the central node calculates
the difference of signal strengths (DOSS) between the reverse
channels and the reference channel, ∆pu = pru − pref , and
transmits the corresponding DOSS to the nodes, which can
extract the common secret, namely the reference channel, cal-
culated as pfu−∆pu. Note that even if the DOSS was observed
by an eavesdropper, he or she fails to infer the common secret,
since he/she is oblivious of pfu. The scheme of Xiao et al. [18]
was also designed for star topologies but differs from that
in [17] in its last step. Instead of calculating the DOSS, the
central node calculates the exclusive-OR between the reverse
channels and the reference channel to share the common
secret. Wei et al. proposes a variety of group key generation
protocols for different star topologies, including single cluster,
independent multi-cluster and overlapped multi-cluster [19].
Finally, Jin et al. analyzed the average time that a user has to
spend on waiting and completing the key generation process
when a central node serves random arrival users [26].
Group key generation protocols have also been conceived
for other network topologies. Thai et al. proposed a multiple
antenna-based protocol for mesh topologies [20]. A pairwise
channel sounding is performed between different mesh nodes.
Wang et al. designed roundtrip channel phase-based group key
generation, where the nodes form a circle and channel probing
is carried out on a pairwise basis [21]. However, its practical
application remained limited because attaining accurate phase
estimation is rather challenging.
It is important to note that all the above research efforts
have mainly focused on sharing the common secret across a
group. However, channel probing still has to be carried out
in a pairwise manner. Thus, when there are Nu users, the
number of user pairs is Nu(Nu−1)2 , and the total number of
transmissions is
N pairwiset =
Nu(Nu − 1)
2
· 2Np, (1)
where Np denotes the number of times the channel is probed.
The resultant complexity is thus in the order of O(N2u) [19].
It is desirable to design an efficient channel probing
mechanism for group key generation, in order to reduce
communications and timing overhead. This subject has not
been extensively investigated in the open literature. Invoking
simultaneous multi-user transmission allows a central node
to transmit to a number of users at the same time, which
alleviates the transmission overhead. The algorithm proposed
in this paper significantly mitigates the probing complexity by
exploiting OFDMA, namely to O(Nu).
III. OFDMA-BASED MULTI-USER KEY GENERATION
As shown in Fig. 2(a), OFDM allocates all the available
subcarriers to a single user, which can then achieve a high
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Fig. 2. Comparison of OFDM and OFDMA.
data rate within the given bandwidth. Duplexing is handled in
a TDD mode. Therefore, OFDM has been employed for im-
proving the key generation rate by exploiting the randomness
both in the time- and in the frequency-domains [27]–[30].
On the other hand, OFDMA allows multiple users to simul-
taneously access the spectrum by transmitting in orthogonal
non-overlapping bands, as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). Since the
OFDM subcarriers are orthogonal, there is no interference
amongst them. This allows the AP to simultaneously obtain
channel measurements of multiple users. Surprisingly, how-
ever, this feature has never been exploited for key generation,
mainly because OFDMA has never been adopted in Wi-Fi
standardization until the recent advent of 802.11ax.
In this paper, we fill the gap and design an efficient multi-
user key generation protocol among an AP and multiple users
by exploiting this beneficial OFDMA feature.
A. Channel Model
This paper investigates an OFDMA-based star topology
network, where an AP simultaneously generates keys with
multiple users based on their random wireless channels. The
system model exemplified by four stations is illustrated in
Fig. 3. We assume that the wireless channels between the
AP and each user are independent where the channel between
the AP and the uth user, hdiru (τ, t), experiences time-varying
multi-path fading, which is given by
hdiru (τ, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
hdiru (τl, t)δ(τ − τl), (2)
where dir = {dl, ul}, represents the DL or the UL, respec-
tively, δ(·) is the Dirac delta function, L is the number of
paths, τl is the the delay of the lth path, and hdiru (τl, t) is the
corresponding attenuation.
Given hdiru (τ, t), the channel’s frequency response can be
calculated as
Hdiru (fk, t) =
L−1∑
l=0
hdiru (τl, t)e
−j2pifkτl . (3)
The DL and UL channels are assumed to be reciprocal, thus
we have
hdlu (τl, t) = h
ul
u (τl, t). (4)
Their corresponding channel frequency responses are also
reciprocal.
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Fig. 3. System model.
The AP allocates orthogonal and non-overlapping subcarri-
ers to different users, i.e.
fu ∩ fv = ∅, u 6= v, (5)
where fu is the subcarrier set allocated to the uth user.
When the eavesdroppers are located several wavelengths3
away from the legitimate users, they tend to experience un-
correlated channel fading [9]. Whenever the eavesdroppers are
very close to the legitimate users, we assume that they can be
spotted, and the legitimate users will pause the key generation
process to maintain security.
B. Protocol
Here we design an efficient OFDMA-based channel probing
scheme, which allows the AP to simultaneously communicate
with multiple users, thus reducing overhead. Key generation
requires bidirectional transmissions to facilitate for the AP and
stations to estimate their common and reciprocal channels. The
system thus operates in the TDD mode, and the AP coordinates
the channel access. The protocol is formulated in Algorithm 1,
and it is detailed in the following.
In the DL and at time tdlj , the AP will first transmit a
message, X(f, tdlj ), and the signal received by the u
th station
can be expressed as
Y dlu (fu, t
dl
j ) = H
dl
u (fu, t
dl
j )X(fu, t
dl
j ) + w
dl
u , (6)
where wdlu is the noise at the user u. Once the message
is received, each station can separately carry out channel
estimation as
Ĥdlu (fu, t
dl
j ) =
Y dlu (fu, tdlj )
Pu(fu)
, (7)
where Pu(fu) is the pre-defined frequency-domain pilot pat-
tern, which is part of the transmitted signal X(fu, tdlj ), and it is
known by both the AP and the stations. Since OFDM systems
require frequency domain channel estimation for channel
equalization, Ĥdlu (fu, tdlj ) is already available in commercial
products, and can be reused for key generation. Therefore, no
additional channel estimation operations are required in the
proposed protocol.
3The wavelength is 6 cm when the carrier frequency is 5 GHz.
Algorithm 1 An OFDMA-based multi-user key generation
protocol
INPUT: {fu}: Subcarrier allocation to users.
INPUT: Np: Number of probing.
OUTPUT: k¯APu , k¯u: Session key for the AP and the uth user.
OUTPUT: kG: Group key for the AP and users.
% Channel Probing
1: for j ← 1 to Np do
2: At tdlj : AP transmits downlink message to users;
users estimate their channel state information (CSI),
Ĥdlu (fu, tdlj ).
3: At tulj = t
dl
j + ∆t: The users transmit UL mes-
sages simultaneously to the AP; AP estimates the CSI,
Ĥulu (fu, tulj ).
4: end for
% Quantization
5: AP quantizes the channel measurements into keys:
Ĥulu (fu, tul)→ kAPu .
6: The uth user quantizes the channel measurements into
keys: Ĥdlu (fu, tdl)→ ku.
% Information reconciliation and privacy amplification
7: AP: kAPu → k¯APu .
8: The uth user: ku → k¯u.
% Group key generation
9: AP calculates the group key as kG = k¯AP1 ⊕ ... ⊕ k¯APu ⊕
...⊕ k¯APNu .
10: The AP encrypts kG using k¯APu and sends it to the u
th
user.
11: The uth user obtains the group key by decryption with
k¯u.
The UL transmission is more complex. The stations should
not transmit on all the OFDM subcarriers, because it would
impose interference at the AP side. Instead, the user-specific
subcarrier allocation information will be first determined by
the AP and then sent to all the stations. Again, there will be
no overlapping amongst the OFMDA subcarriers allocated to
different stations. Additionally, all stations should commence
and complete their transmissions at the same time, in order to
not cause intra-cell interference. In this case, the DL transmis-
sion can be treated as a trigger message for informing all the
stations to initiate their UL transmissions. At time instance
tulj = t
dl
j + ∆t, all stations simultaneously transmit their
packets with the same length using their allocated OFDMA
subcarriers. The waveform received at the AP in the frequency-
domain can be expressed as
Y ul(f, tulj ) =
Nu∑
i=1
Y ulu (fu, t
ul
j )
=
Nu∑
i=1
Hulu (fu, t
ul
j )Xu(fu, t
ul
j ) + w
ul
AP, (8)
where wulAP is the noise at the AP. Since these subcarriers
are orthogonal and non-overlapping, the AP can separate the
signals received in the frequency-domain according to the
5OFDMA subcarrier allocations, and estimate the CSI between
itself and the uth station as
Ĥulu (fu, t
ul
j ) =
Y ulu (fu, tulj )
Pu(fu)
. (9)
The above DL and UL transmissions complete a pair of
channel probing actions. The AP and the stations will con-
tinue such probing until they obtain sufficient measurements,
{Ĥulu (fu, tulj ), Ĥdlu (fu, tdlj )}. There should be time separation,
namely sampling period Ts, between any two adjacent sam-
plings. The frequency-domain response of any subcarrier,
Hdiru (fk, t), is subject to a similar Doppler spectrum, as
well as similar coherence time [28], unless there is a large
difference between the lowest and highest OFDMA subcarrier
frequencies. We can thus design the sampling period according
to the Doppler frequency, or equivalently to the coherence
time.
Once the channel probing is completed, we then use a mean
value-based quantization as an example, which converts the
measurements s to 1, when they are above the mean value µs,
or 0 otherwise, which can be mathematically expressed as
k(i) =
{
1, if s(i) > µX ;
0, if s(i) ≤ µX .
(10)
The AP and the uth user can then generate a pair of keys,
{kAPu , ku}, which usually do not match because the channel
measurements of the AP and of the stations are unlikely to
be identical due to their unsynchronized sampling and noise.
Information reconciliation and privacy amplification will then
enable the AP and stations to agree on the same keys, yielding
k¯APu = k¯u. (11)
These two steps can use the mechanisms as in other key
generation systems [3], which is out of the scope of this paper.
It is important to note that each pair of channel probing
actions only occupies a pair of time slots, which significantly
mitigates the channel’s occupation time. The total number of
transmissions can be expressed as
Nmut = (1 +Nu) ·Np, (12)
and the resultant complexity is O(Nu), which is much lower
than that of the pairwise group key generation systems,
O(N2u). The transmission reduction ratio of our multi-user
protocol is
G =
Nmut
N pairwiset
=
Nu + 1
Nu(Nu − 1) , (13)
which is quite significant. For example, when there are Nu = 4
stations, our protocol only needs a fraction of 512 transmissions
compared to those required by the pairwise-based group key
generation protocol.
As shown in Fig. 1, the keys generated can serve as the seed
for the upper layer cryptographic schemes and protocols, such
as the Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) at the medium access
control (MAC) layer of Wi-Fi. To elaborate, WPA2 is based
on advanced encryption standard (AES), which supports key
lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits. The length of the channel
probing, Np, will thus be determined by the cryptographic
applications, which is selected for ensuring that the AP and
the stations obtain sufficient channel measurements for key
generation.
Following the key generation process, the AP establishes a
unique key, k¯APu , with the u
th station, which can be used as
the private session key for encrypting unicast transmissions.
Additionally, the AP can generate a group key by calculating
kG = k¯
AP
1 ⊕ ...⊕ k¯APu ⊕ ...⊕ k¯APNu , (14)
where ⊕ is the exclusive-OR operation. The AP will then
encrypt the group key, kG, using k¯APu and send it to the u
th
station, which will receive the ciphertext and obtain the group
key by decryption using k¯u. The group key can then be used
for securely broadcasting messages to all stations.
C. Metrics
In the following, we present the key performance indicators
used in our analysis.
1) Channel Reciprocity: The similarity of two variables,
su and sv , can be quantified by Pearson’s cross-correlation
coefficient, which is defined as [3]
ρ(su, sv) =
∑Np
i=1(su(i)− µsu)(sv(i)− µsv )√∑Np
i=1(su(i)− µsu)2
√∑Np
i=1(sv(i)− µsv )2
.
(15)
After the analog measurements are converted to binary se-
quences, we can also use the key disagreement rate (KDR)
for quantifying their similarity, defined as
KDR(ku, kv) =
∑lk
i=1 |ku(i)− kv(i)|
lk
, (16)
where lk is the length of the key, ku.
Approximate channel reciprocity ensures that the keying
parties generate similar keys. In a TDD system, the accuracy
of channel reciprocity is limited by the non-simultaneous
sampling and noise. We use the correlation coefficient between
the channel measurements of the AP and that of the uth user,
ρ[Ĥulu (fu, tulj ), Ĥdlu (fu, tdlj )], as well as the KDR between the
keys at the AP and that of the uth user, KDR(kAPu , ku), to
quantify the performance.
2) Key Uniqueness: The session keys between the AP and
each user should be unique as they are used to encrypt their
unicast transmissions, i.e. kAPu should differ significantly from
kAPv , u 6= v. We still use the cross-correlation and KDR to
quantify the difference. Without loss of generality, we only
compare the channel measurements and corresponding keys
of the UL transmissions, i.e. the results at the AP side. We
use the correlation coefficient of the channel measurements
between the AP and the uth station and that between the AP
and the vth station, ρ[Ĥulu (fu, tulj ), Ĥulv (fv, tulj )], as well as the
KDR between the AP and the uth station and that between
the AP and the vth station, KDR(kAPu , k
AP
v ), to quantify the
performance.
63) Key Randomness: The keys generated are used for the
cryptographic applications, which require a random key. A
non-random key will render the cryptographic scheme vul-
nerable to brute force attacks [25]. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) randomness test suite [31]
is a popular tool for evaluating the randomness of the output
of the random number generator (RNG) and pseudo random
number generator (PRNG). It has been widely used in the key
generation research area [8]–[10], [12]–[14], [17], [21], [28],
[30], and it is also adopted in this paper.
The test suite provides 15 randomness tests, each of which
will return a p-value. When the p-value is larger than a
threshold, e.g. 0.01, then we declare that the sequence passes
a test. The sequence is deemed random, if it passes all the
available tests.
We used the above metrics for evaluating the raw keys, kAPu
and ku, rather than the final keys, k¯APu and k¯u. Firstly, the raw
key is intuitively required to evaluate the channel reciprocity.
Secondly, the uniqueness between kAPu and k
AP
v will lead to
the conclusion of the uniqueness of k¯APu and k¯
AP
v , because
k¯APu is hashed from k
AP
u . Finally, because the output of a hash
function is usually randomized, it is necessary to evaluate the
randomness of the raw key, kAPu .
IV. CASE STUDY WITH IEEE 802.11AX
In this section, we tailored the proposed algorithm to
IEEE 802.11ax standard.
A. IEEE 802.11ax Protocol
IEEE 802.11ax is a new Wi-Fi standard amendment, which
is going to be released in the late 2019 [32]. It extends its
predecessors, namely IEEE 802.11ac/n/g/a, by numerous ben-
eficial new features, including DL and UL multi-user access
supported by OFDMA and MU-MIMO, higher-order mod-
ulation (1024-QAM), reduced power consumption, extended
long range for outdoor communications, target wakeup time,
basic service set colouring, etc. IEEE 802.11ax is suitable for
enterprise office and stadium scenarios, as well as for outdoor
operation and IoT scenarios. It aims for improving the average
user throughput by a factor of at least four in high-density
environments w.r.t. 802.11ac. This section briefly introduces
the new features relevant to key generation. Readers who
are interested in further details are referred to the standard
amendment [32] for more information.
1) Physical Layer: Table I shows the new features of the
IEEE 802.11ax physical layer compared to those of the legacy
IEEE 802.11ac. IEEE 802.11ax uses both OFDMA and MU-
MIMO as physical layer technologies for supporting multi-
user access. The multi-user OFDMA and DL MU-MIMO will
be implemented in the IEEE 802.11ax wave 1, but UL MU-
MIMO will be deferred to the wave 2. Similarly to IEEE
802.11ac, IEEE 802.11ax DL multi-user MIMO uses explicit
feedback for feeding back the CSI. The transmit beamformer
sends a sounding frame/null data packet (NDP), and the
receive beamformee exploits it for estimating the CSI, which is
then quantized and fed back to the beamformer [33]. However,
it has been experimentally demonstrated that even when the
TABLE I
PHYSICAL LAYER ENHANCEMENT OF IEEE 802.11AX COMPARED TO
IEEE 802.11AC
IEEE 802.11ac IEEE 802.11ax
Carrier Frequency (GHz) 5 2.4 or 5
Bandwidth (MHz) 20, 40, 60, 80,80+80, or 160
20, 40, 60, 80,
80+80, or 160
FFT Size 64, 128, 256, 512 256, 512, 2014, 2048
Subcarrier Spacing (kHz) 312.5 78.125
OFDM Symbol Duration
(µs) 3.2 12.8
OFDM Cyclic Prefix (µs) 0.8/0.4 0.8/1.6/3.2
Multi-user Access DL, MIMO DL and UL,OFDMA and MIMO
CSI feedback is encrypted, attackers may still be able to infer
the CSI [34]. Therefore, the IEEE 802.11ax multi-user MIMO
framework is not directly suitable for key generation, hence
this paper relies on exploiting OFDMA.
In IEEE 802.11ax, there are more OFDM subcarriers than
that in IEEE 802.11ac, hence a higher data rate can be
supported. Additionally, IEEE 802.11ac only supports single-
user OFDM, but IEEE 802.11ax extends it to multi-user
OFDMA transmissions, for both the DL and UL, which is
suitable for dense environments.
The IEEE 802.11ax amendment defines a resource unit
(RU) (or subcarrier) allocation table, which describes RU
assignment to stations. For example, there are 256 subcarriers
in total for the 20 MHz bandwidth; when the allocation index
is 112, the AP can serve four stations simultaneously through
four RUs, each having 52 non-overlapping subcarriers. The
rest of the subcarriers are used as guard band. The full RU
allocation table is defined in Table 28-24 of [32].
It should be noted time and frequency synchronization is
very important in IEEE 802.11ax, which will be affected by
the transmission time delay, clock frequency offset and timing
errors. IEEE 802.11ax tackles this issue by using accurate time
synchronization, as detailed in [32].
2) MAC Layer: The MAC layer protocol coordinates the
channel access of different users in order to avoid colli-
sions. IEEE 802.11ax supports multi-user access by employing
OFDMA and MIMO. Regarding the UL multi-user trans-
missions, it is important to ensure that all stations are syn-
chronized so that they simultaneously commence their trans-
missions, because asynchronous transmissions would cause
interference at the AP side.
IEEE 802.11ax tackles this challenge by introducing a new
scheme, namely the high efficiency (HE) trigger-based (TB)
UL transmissions, which is illustrated in Fig. 4. The AP first
sends a DL trigger packet to the stations which have data
requests. The trigger packet informs the stations when they can
start transmitting and the duration of the transmission to ensure
that all the stations start and complete their transmissions at the
same time. After a specified short interframe space (SIFS) time
interval (tSIFS = 10 µs in the 2.4 GHz band and tSIFS = 16 µs
in the 5 GHz band), the stations will simultaneously transmit to
the AP. After the reception, the AP will echo an acknowledge
7(ACK) frame to the stations to indicate a positive packet
reception. By contrast, the lack of an ACK frame indicates
negative reception. This completes the HE TB transmissions.
At first glance, the spectrum efficiency is not improved
compared to the single-user OFDM systems, since the total
spectral resources remain the same. However, the IEEE 802.11
MAC layer uses carrier-sense multiple access with collision
avoidance (CSMA/CA) to negotiate channel access among
stations, which requires a number of packet exchanges, such
as the classic Request to Send (RTS)/Clear to Send (CTS). The
stations, which have transmission request will back off for a
random interval, whenever the channel is sensed to be busy.
CSMA/CA will become less efficient when the number of
stations increases, since there is a higher probability of chan-
nel collisions. The multi-user transmission feature of IEEE
802.11ax allows multiple stations to simultaneously transmit,
which reduces the overhead of channel sensing and improves
the spectral efficiency, especially in a dense deployment [35].
Considering road traffic systems as an analogy, the CSMA/CA
operates in a similar manner to a round-about, which is
efficient when the network traffic is low. On the other hand,
the central scheduling relying on a traffic light is more efficient
when the traffic load is high.
B. Key Generation Prototype
The multi-user transmission feature is ideal for designing
an efficient multi-user key generation protocol. An IEEE
802.11ax-based key generation system is thus designed as fol-
lows, assuming the allocation index to be 112 as an example.
The AP transmits a trigger packet to four stations modulated
using DL multi-user OFDMA. Upon receiving the trigger, the
stations will estimate the channel using the preamble in the HE
TB frame. After an interval of tSIFS, they will separately and
simultaneously send their packets to the AP at their allocated
subcarriers, without causing interference to each other. These
packets will arrive at the AP at the same time, and the AP
can carry out the channel estimation for each station using the
respective preambles in their UL frames. After waiting for a
sampling period Ts, the AP and stations will repeat the above
processes until they collect sufficient channel measurements.
Afterwards, the AP and stations will carry out quantization,
information reconciliation as well as privacy amplification, and
finally generate the same keys locally.
It is worth noting that key generation can be carried out
along with the normal data transmission, and hence dedicated
communications are not mandatory. Whenever the AP initiates
the HE TB UL mode, the AP and stations will exploit the
existing channel estimation information, obtained by data and
trigger packets, respectively. Therefore, key generation does
not introduce additional energy consumption for the channel
probing stage, which is a very attractive feature, especially for
power-constrained IoT devices.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, we provide simulations result for demon-
strating the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
TABLE II
CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
Bandwidth 20 MHz
FFT Size 256
DL OFDMA
UL HE trigger-based
Allocation index 112
Number of users 4
Number of subcarriers each user 52
TABLE III
CHANNEL PARAMETERS
Sampling frequency 20 MHz
Carrier frequency, fc 5.25 GHz
Delay Profile Model-B
Environmental speed, v 5 km/h
Distance between the AP and users 10 m
SNR 0:2:20 dB
A. Setup
We built the transceiver simulation models of both the
AP and station based on the IEEE 802.11ax examples and
functions provided by the Matlab WLAN toolbox [36]. The
WLAN toolbox implements all the necessary functions, in-
cluding waveform construction, channel modelling, receiver
processing, etc.
The detailed configuration parameters of the AP and stations
are shown in the Table II. In order to focus on the benefits
provided by the multi-user OFDMA feature, we consider a
single input single output (SISO) system.
In order to emulate realistic environments, a practical
IEEE 802.11ax channel model is used [37]. We assume that the
stations are located at different places, but their channel mod-
els and statistical parameters are the same. An indoor mobile
environment is considered with the main channel parameters
shown in Table III. The station speed is 5 km/h, which is a
typical walking speed. The Saleh-Valenzuela channel model
is used, where there are two clusters and nine taps in the
Model-B. Please refer to the Matlab help file for detailed
explanation [38].
Because the channel frequency is 5.25 GHz, tSIFS = 16 µs,
then the sampling interval is set as ∆t = 16 µs. The channel
coherence time is in the order of
Tc ∝ 1
fd
=
c
vfc
= 41 ms, (17)
where c is the speed of light. The sampling period is thus
set as Ts = 50 ms. Sampling interval and sampling period is
illustrated in Fig. 4. Similar to the main trend in key generation
research, this paper also considers a slow fading channel. A
fast fading environment encountered in vehicular communica-
tions will impact the measurements’ correlation [39], which is
set aside for our future research.
Based on the above configurations, we have carried out
extensive simulations, and collected Np = 3, 000 pairs of
channel probing. As the key required by the cryptographic
applications, e.g. AES, is only 128/192/256 bits, it is not
necessary to perform so many channel probing realizations in
real applications. However, increasing the number of channel
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Fig. 4. Trigger-based UL multi-user transmission in IEEE 802.11ax.
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Fig. 5. The UL power spectrum of the received waveforms at the AP of the
HE TB mode.
probing realizations will help to get a more accurate statistical
analysis.
B. Results
It is essential to ensure that the transmitted signals of
different stations do not interfere with each other at the AP
during the UL HE TB transmissions. Although in reality the
waveforms of different stations are combined at the AP, the
simulation model allows us to separately save the waveforms
of each station, and to analyze their individual power spectrum,
which is shown in Fig. 5. It can be observed that each
station only occupies its allocated subcarriers, and the intra-
cell interference is quite low, at least 20 dB lower than the
useful signal power.
The channel responses of the first subcarriers of the first fifty
received packets of the four stations, i.e. Ĥdiru (fu(1), tdir),
are shown in Fig. 6 as examples, for both the UL and DL.
When the channel condition is good, providing a 20 dB SNR,
the UL and DL channel estimates match quite well, which
is indicating a high correlation. Additionally, the channel
responses of each station are different and uncorrelated, which
is a necessary condition in order to generate unique keys for
the stations.
Moreover, the detailed results of the channel reciprocity
are shown in Fig. 7. Intuitively, the higher the SNR, the
TABLE IV
NIST RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF KEY SEQUENCES OF THE FOUR
STATIONS, kAPu . SNR = 20 DB.
Test Station 1 Station 2 Station 3 Station 4
Frequency 0.073 0.684 0.166 0.034
Block frequency 0.415 0.937 0.86 0.107
Runs 0.48 0.051 0.868 0.241
Longest run of 1s 0.842 0.803 0.54 0.025
DFT 0.262 0.708 1 0.025
Serial 0.63 0.878 0.559 0.0660.487 0.877 0.554 0.48
Appro. entropy 0.245 0.403 0.174 0.029
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.121 0.971 0.284 0.021
Cum. sums (rev) 0.121 0.837 0.242 0.045
higher the cross correlation. On the other hand, the KDR
decreases as the SNR increases. The correction capability
of the information reconciliation is determined by the error
correction code selected. A Reed-Solomon (RS) (n, k, t) code
is capable of correcting
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
errors out of n symbols. For
example, an RS (63, 31, 16) code is capable of correcting 16
errors and the correction capacity is about 25%. As shown
in Fig. 7, when the SNR is higher than 8 dB, the KDRs
of all four stations are always lower than 25%. Therefore,
the mismatch can be corrected and key generation can be
successfully executed.
The results of the key uniqueness are shown in Fig. 8.
The correlation coefficients of different pairs of the channel
measurements are close to zero, indicating the absence of
similarity between them. The corresponding KDRs are around
0.5, which is no better than a random guess. Therefore, the
session keys, kAPu , are significantly different from each other,
and can be used securely.
Finally, the results of randomness tests of the key sequences
at the four stations, {kAPu }, are given in Table IV. All the p-
values are above the threshold, i.e. 0.01, which means that
all the session keys pass the selected randomness tests. In
summary, our proposed multi-user key generation protocol
is capable of generating unique keys with good channel
reciprocity and key randomness, which is suitable for cryp-
tographic schemes.
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Fig. 6. Channel responses of the first subcarrier of different stations. SNR = 20 dB.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed an efficient OFDMA-based multi-user
key generation protocol, which is achieved by simultaneous
channel measurements among multiple users on both the UL
and DL. A prototype of the new Wi-Fi standard amendment
IEEE 802.11ax was investigated as a case study. We sim-
ulated the full IEEE 802.11ax AP and station transceivers
models based on the Matlab WLAN toolbox. Based on that,
we carried out extensive simulations, and demonstrated that
the proposed multi-user key generation protocol has a good
performance in terms of low interference among users, high
channel reciprocity and good key uniqueness and randomness,
while being able to substantially reduce the key generation
overhead. Our future work includes the implementation of the
proposed protocol using software defined radio platforms and
evaluation of its performance in various real-life scenarios.
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